In June, barely a week after the Karachi Airport attack, General Sharif did something no one could expect: he changed the security paradigm under which the Army had so far compelled Pakistan to live. Instead of supporting the government’s “peace” talks with the Pakistani Taliban, he decided to attack the safe havens of the Pakistani Taliban and their local and foreign affiliates. Operation Zarb-e-Azb took the war to North Waziristan, where elements “friendly” to Pakistan trained with those not so friendly to it. Since the country’s foreign and domestic security policies are run by the Army, the Foreign Office, firmly tethered to GHQ, had a hard time detaching its thinking from General Sharif’s predecessor, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani. North Waziristan marked a clear departure: it deviated from the received wisdom that any assault on the Taliban in the north would trigger a backlash in the south, where cities were already vulnerable to suicide-bombings and targeted assassinations. It also shook the kaleidoscope of regional and global politics out of pattern: the operation pleased Afghanistan and India, who feared cross-border proxy attacks, and the Western alliance led by the United States, always asking Pakistan to “do more,” in other words, eliminate the Pakistani Taliban and their Afghan counterparts attacking U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan. Interestingly he also boasts impressive ‘diplomatic’ miles since he took office, especially since the operation took off. He naturally spearheads the contact, and more, with Kabul. And he was quite clearly the first Pakistani not to be told to “do more” in Washington for quite a while. Perhaps the outsiders – at least the stakeholders in this war – figured that there was really nothing to write home about till he come to the scene; and ended the old policy of talks, good Taliban, etc, once and for all. That would explain, partially, others’ faith in him. The war, meanwhile, is now about to enter a markedly different, far more subtle phase. From the mountains and valleys of Fata it must now come to urban centres and large cities across the country, particularly PML-N’s stronghold of Punjab. The military will, therefore, shift from highland militants to the more sectarian, long fed and pampered, outfits of interior Punjab and Sindh. That is precisely why Gen Raheel should avoid juggling too many balls at present and instead concentrate squarely on the insurgency. News that he is holding meetings with leading Italian politicians, especially the foreign minister, is strange in terms of processing. It is best if politicians are left to handle the politics – even though Pakistan is still without a foreign minister. Hopefully Gen Raheel will limit his attention to things that demand it most – the war, NAP, Nacta, India, and now, the floods again.
pk.shafaqna.com
