Five years ago, the Taliban entered Kabul, bringing to an abrupt end two decades of war after the collapse of the Ashraf Ghani government and the chaotic withdrawal of US and NATO forces. The Taliban declared victory and promised that their second stint in power would be different from their first. Five years on, they have achieved one undeniable feat: they have consolidated control over virtually the entire country. The more important question, however, is whether they have succeeded in governing Afghanistan better. On that count, the record remains deeply contested.
Afghanistan is certainly quieter today. The large-scale war that defined much of the country for two decades has ended, and the Taliban face no nationwide armed insurgency comparable to the one they themselves once waged against the Afghan government and foreign forces. For millions of Afghans who lived through years of bombings, airstrikes, roadside attacks and displacement, the reduction in conventional violence has brought a measure of relief.
But there is an important caveat to the Taliban’s claim of having delivered peace. They are no longer an insurgency fighting the state; they are the state. The disappearance of attacks against the Afghan government is therefore partly a consequence of the Taliban having eliminated the government they were fighting. Ending an insurgency after seizing power is not the same thing as building a peaceful, stable and inclusive society. The real test of governance is what comes after the guns fall silent.
The sharpest criticism of the Taliban concerns women and girls. When they returned to Kabul, the Taliban sought to reassure the international community that women would be allowed to study and work within what they described as an Islamic framework. The reality has been dramatically different. Afghanistan remains the only country in the world where girls and women are formally barred from secondary and higher education. UNESCO said in August 2025 that nearly 2.2 million girls had been excluded from education beyond the primary level.
Five years is not a short disruption to a child’s education. It is an entire formative period. A girl who was 11 when the Taliban returned is now 16. She has spent much of her adolescence outside a classroom, while a generation of young women is being denied the opportunity to acquire skills, qualifications and professional experience. The consequences will not be limited to individual lives. Afghanistan’s healthcare system, schools, economy and public institutions will eventually pay the price for excluding such a large proportion of the population from education and employment.
The Taliban’s restrictions on women have also deepened Afghanistan’s isolation. The issue is not simply one of international opinion or diplomatic recognition. A country cannot easily develop its human capital while systematically excluding half its population from large sections of education and economic life. Nor can it build an effective modern economy while restricting the contribution that women can make to it.
The economic picture, meanwhile, is more complicated than either the Taliban’s supporters or their critics sometimes suggest. Afghanistan’s economy has shown a degree of resilience despite the withdrawal of most international aid, severe financial constraints and continuing political isolation. The World Bank estimated that real GDP grew by around 4.8 per cent in 2025, following growth in previous years. Yet it also warned that the recovery has not translated into improved living standards, with poverty, weak incomes and employment pressures continuing to weigh heavily on ordinary Afghans.
That distinction matters. Economic growth on paper does not necessarily mean economic security for households. Afghanistan remains heavily dependent on a fragile economic base, while rapid population growth, limited employment opportunities, weak private-sector capacity and declining external assistance constrain its prospects. The return of large numbers of Afghans from neighbouring countries has further increased pressure on jobs, housing and public services. The economy has survived, but survival should not be confused with transformation.
There is also the question of humanitarian need. Afghanistan remains one of the world’s most challenging environments for humanitarian agencies, with food insecurity, poverty and inadequate access to basic services continuing to affect millions. A government that can maintain territorial control but cannot provide sustainable livelihoods and essential services has only partially fulfilled the responsibilities of governing.
Security presents an even more complicated picture — and one that brings Pakistan directly into focus.
The Taliban have repeatedly pledged that Afghan territory will not be used against other countries. Yet UN monitoring continues to identify multiple terrorist organisations operating from Afghanistan. A recent UN Monitoring Team report said that regional countries remained concerned about the number of terrorist groups in Afghanistan and their spillover effects. It specifically noted that the TTP had been given greater liberty and support by the Afghan de facto authorities and that attacks against Pakistan had increased. The report also identified continuing activity by Al-Qaeda and ISIL-K.
For Pakistan, the TTP has become the defining security issue in relations with Kabul. Islamabad has repeatedly maintained that Afghan territory must not be used as a launching pad for attacks against Pakistan. That demand is hardly unreasonable. A government that seeks international legitimacy and normal relations with its neighbours cannot simultaneously allow armed groups operating from its territory to threaten those neighbours.
The problem is particularly frustrating for Pakistan because Islamabad had supported engagement with the Afghan Taliban and repeatedly advocated dialogue after their return to power. Pakistan had hoped that a Taliban government in Kabul would be more responsive to Pakistani security concerns. Five years later, that calculation has produced a deeply disappointing outcome. Relations have deteriorated over cross-border militancy, border management, trade, refugee returns and the longstanding dispute over the Durand Line.
UN reporting makes the dilemma even clearer. The Taliban have taken action against ISIL-K and have demonstrated that they possess some capacity to suppress groups they regard as enemies. Yet the TTP has continued to enjoy a considerably more permissive environment. The UN has described TTP as one of the largest terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan and linked its attacks against Pakistan to military confrontation between the two countries.
This creates an uncomfortable question for the Taliban: if they are capable of acting against one militant organisation, why can they not demonstrate the same determination against groups targeting Afghanistan’s neighbours? Afghanistan cannot demand that other states respect its sovereignty while allowing militant organisations to exploit that sovereignty for cross-border attacks.
There is also a wider regional danger. UN assessments have repeatedly pointed to the presence of numerous terrorist organisations in Afghanistan, including Al-Qaeda, TTP and ISIL-K. The concern is not merely that these groups may attack Pakistan or other neighbouring states. The greater danger is that prolonged sanctuary, training networks and ideological cooperation could eventually produce threats that extend beyond South and Central Asia.
The Taliban’s response to this challenge will therefore be an important measure of whether they have genuinely evolved from an insurgent movement into a responsible governing authority. A government cannot simply demand recognition while treating counterterrorism commitments as optional.
So what have five years of Taliban rule actually produced?
There are some undeniable gains. The Taliban have maintained control over the country. The nationwide war has ended. The state has not collapsed despite extraordinary economic and diplomatic pressures, and the economy has shown modest signs of recovery. For ordinary Afghans, the end of large-scale fighting has brought real relief.
But those gains are accompanied by an equally undeniable list of failures. Women and girls have been pushed out of education and much of public life. Political space remains extremely limited. Humanitarian and economic pressures persist. The country remains internationally isolated, while terrorist organisations continue to operate from its territory. And relations with Pakistan, one of Afghanistan’s most important neighbours, have deteriorated sharply over security concerns.
The Taliban have therefore answered one question but not the more important one. They have demonstrated that they can take and hold power. They have not yet demonstrated that they can use that power to build a more inclusive, prosperous and secure Afghanistan.
Five years after Kabul fell, the Taliban have won the war in the most literal sense: they defeated their opponents and established uncontested control over most of the country. But governing is a different challenge. Peace is more than the absence of battlefield fighting; stability requires institutions, economic opportunity, basic rights and security for neighbours as well as citizens.
Afghanistan is quieter than it was during the years of war. But quieter does not necessarily mean better. Until the Taliban can translate territorial control into inclusive governance, economic opportunity, respect for basic rights and credible action against militant groups, their greatest achievement will remain the consolidation of power — not the transformation of Afghanistan.
Shafaqna Pakistan
pakistan.shafaqna.com
Note: Shafaqna do not endorse the views expressed in the article
