Dr Ejaz Hussain
SHAFAQNA PAKISTAN (Shia News Agency)
Cricket is a passion for Pakistanis and Indians. The two sides are facing each other in the Cricket World Cup 2015. Given the tense current relations between Pakistan and India, the two teams will certainly feel extraordinary pressure that may impact their match performance and results. More importantly, win or defeat emotionally impacts fans across the border. This article will attempt to briefly but critically explain the nature, dimension and level of India-Pakistan relations from 1947 to 1971. The aim is to highlight and explain efforts at war and, later, peace building through sports, especially cricket.
To begin with, the stated guiding principles for the making of foreign policy in this formative phase were solidarity with the Islamic world and peaceful relations with neighbouring and other countries of the world. However, before Pakistan could develop good relations with its neighbours, its tribals, with implicit support from some state circles, engaged in an armed conflict over Kashmir with India in October 1947. The tribals attempted to capitalise on the indigenous resistance movement in the Valley besides pursuing material goals. Consequently, India landed its troops in that princely state, which literally turned, with time, into a battlefield between Pakistan and India. The first war (1947-1948) in and over Kashmir is very important in many respects. First, it highlighted a huge difference of opinion over strategy and tactics between the military and civilian leaderships of Pakistan. Secondly, the military, civil bureaucracy and politicians’ preferences diverged over the issue. Thirdly, politicians, the military and civil bureaucracy on both sides preferred to strategically essentialise the ‘other’ as a natural and permanent enemy. In addition, the Kashmir conflict was used as an instrument by both the states to draw public attention away from the issues related to state organisation, governance and the economy.
However, it is to be noted that despite the memory of the first war, Pakistani and Indian civilian leaderships chose to normalise. In this respect, the Liaquat-Nehru Pact, signed on April 8, 1950, is significant for more than one reason. It emphasised: a) alleviation of fears of the religious minorities on both sides, b) elevation of communal peace and c) creation of an atmosphere in which the two countries could resolve their other differences. Nevertheless, despite the signing of the pact, rhetoric prevailed upon rational thinking since Karachi had started tilting towards the western bloc, while Delhi was emerging as a non-aligned state with a soft corner for the USSR. Moreover, the death of M A Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan coupled with the organisational and political degeneration of the Muslim League furthered weakened the pace of such diplomatic exchanges from the Pakistani side. Thus, in 1951, the civil bureaucracy preferred to directly assume power. This bureaucracy, in strategic cooperation with the military, allied the country with the capitalist bloc in order to seek economic and diplomatic support in the context of Kashmir. Pakistan signed a Mutual Defence Assistance Treaty with the US in May 1954 and subsequently entered SEATO and CENTO.
By October 1958, the Pakistan military, while marking its agency, intervened in the country’s politics overtly. Under direct military rule, Pakistan did not face any grave security threat from anywhere. Indeed, in 1958-1959, Ayub Khan floated the idea of entering into a security pact with India. However, the move was restrained on account of Rawalpindi’s Cold War commitments. The Ayub-led military did succeed in interacting with India positively. The two states signed the Indus Water Treaty in 1960. This development, in my view, points to the partial utility of a realist view of India-Pakistan relations. Very interestingly, under Nehru, India attempted to build peaceful relations with the communist bloc. However, the 1962 India-China war put an end to such experiments. Moreover, almost at the same time, India moved its troops into the Rann of Kutch due to its undemarcated status.
However, the tension between the two countries did not burst into a large scale war until April 1965. Quite ironically, despite military de-escalation, a ceasefire agreement and submission of the Kutch affair to international arbitration, the two sides entered into another conflict in September 1965. However, the Kashmiris’ non-military attitude might have come as a surprise for Pakistan military strategists. On the one hand, the Indian army retaliated in time and occupied the critical passes in, for example, Kargil. Due to change of command at a critical juncture, poor organisation, lack of coordination and poor planning, Pakistan remained unable to achieve the desired objectives related to Kashmir. The second war lasted for 17 days and Pakistan remained unable to get the expected military support from its allies, especially the US. On the other hand, India received diplomatic support from Moscow. Nevertheless, the two states ranked the international input into consideration and accepted a UN-led ceasefire. Resultantly, the two states signed a declaration not to have recourse to force, settle their disputes through peaceful means and to withdraw their troops to a pre-August 5 position.
Contrary to India in the post-war period, Pakistan went through a long phase of agitational politics. Ayub Khan was severally criticised by Bhutto-led politicians. However, instead of handing over powers to the speaker of the National Assembly (who happened to be a Bengali), the general-cum-president favoured his own military man on March 25, 1969. Subsequently, General Yahya Khan imposed martial law. However, even under martial law, the process of protest politics continued despite Yahya Khan’s sloppy attempt at democratisation. The Sheikh Mujib-led Awami League, while remaining within the confines of the federation of Pakistan, chose to participate in the 1970 elections. Though the former won a majority of the seats, it was not allowed to form a government by the West Pakistan-based civil-military bureaucracy and political class. Little wonder that military means were used to subjugate the already marginalised Bengalis. “Till the night of March 25, everybody in East Pakistan was a Pakistani. By morning, everyone was a Bangladeshi. This happened due to the unexpected and unwanted army operation. The army was searching our homes. They killed Hindus to make us realise that they (West Pakistanis) are better Muslims and better patriots,” narrated a Bangladeshi professor to me.
Consequently, Mujib was arrested. In this respect, the military had already seen the Indian hand in the East problem on account of the Indian plane hijacked to go to Pakistan in March 1971. Consequently, India had stopped Pakistani planes from using its airspace. Moreover, explicit Indian involvement was witnessed when the third war started between Pakistan and India on November 22, 1971. The latter had ostensibly opted to rescue the Mukti Bahini, which had been struggling against the military operation for six months. Thus, as a result of the India-Pakistan war, the latter, in the absence of any military support from its allies, had no choice than to accept a de facto independent state of Bangladesh.
Courtesy Dailytimes.com
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